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Figure 1: Charles Chaplin held up by Douglas Fairbanks, sellingWWIWar Bonds. Credit: The New York Times Photo Archives
(1918).
ABSTRACT
In this early-stage research, a multidisciplinary approach is pre-
sented for the detection of propaganda in the media, and for mod-
eling the spread of propaganda and disinformation using semantic
web and graph theory. An ontology will be designed which has the
theoretical underpinnings from multiple disciplines including the
social sciences and epidemiology. An additional objective of this
work is to automate triple extraction from unstructured text which
surpasses the state-of-the-art performance.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computingmethodologies→Ontology engineering; Seman-
tic networks; Information extraction.
KEYWORDS
Propaganda, Semantic Web, Ontological Computation, Machine
Learning, Knowledge Extraction, Multidisciplinary.
1 INTRODUCTION
The word “infodemic” was coined by David Rothkopf in 2003, as
a blend of the words information and pandemic at the time of the
SARS breakout. “What exactly do I mean by the ‘infodemic’? A
few facts, mixed with fear, speculation and rumor, amplified and
relayed swiftly worldwide by modern information technologies...”
[20]. Rothkopf’s prescient description depicts an almost naive au-
dience of unwitting participants merely interfacing with a rapidly
evolving misinformation ecosystem. By 2013, the World Economic
Forum named “massive digital misinformation” as a global risk.
[11]. And as recently as January 2021, journalist Chris Stirewalt put
it this way: “Having worked in cable news for more than a decade
after a wonderfully misspent youth in newspapers, I can tell you the
result: a nation of news consumers both overfed and malnourished.
Americans gorge themselves daily on empty informational calories,
indulging their sugar fixes of self-affirming half-truths and even
outright lies” [27].
To confirm Stirewalt’s hypothesis, one only needs to look at
the rise in popularity of fringe news networks, and the evolution
of programming in mainstream media [1], from the lens of basic
supply vs demand economics in the competition for viewership,
and ultimately, advertising dollars. In the aftermath of the 2020 US
presidential election, what were once fringe networks, like OAN
and Newsmax, have grown in viewership by telling increasingly
partisan, and outright fabricated stories, supporting the hypothesis
that the demand is indeed substantial. So substantial in fact, that
in early 2021, Fox News cancelled its prime-time news reporting
replacing it with an “opinion” hour, in the hopes of winning back
some of their most gluttonous viewers - to use Stirewalt’s analogy.
Add to that the miasma emanating from social media platforms like
Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Parler and Gab to name a few, and we
end up with the perfect breeding ground for information disease,
and a fertile soil for the sowing of propaganda like the Catholic
Church couldn’t have even dreamed of! [17]
Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter have come un-
der scrutiny for not doing enough to stop the flow of disinformation
through their networks, while at the same time facing accusations
of ideologically motivated censorship when users’ posts have been
either flagged, demonetised, or removed. How to strike the right
balance between harm mitigation and censorship is not a new prob-
lem. What is unique today is the specific sociopolitical context and
technological landscape. The premise of this work is that whatever
solutions we come up with, we have to treat the present context as
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a fundamental starting point, borrowing from multiple disciplines














Figure 2: Multidisciplinary theoretical underpinnings. Each
circle represents a discipline, at the intersection of which
this work resides.
2 STATE OF THE ART
2.1 Propaganda Identification
For the purposes of this work, any information which is intended to
influence beliefs or modify behaviors in order to further an agenda,
will be considered propaganda. Often, this type of information is
of questionable veracity, but this is not a requirement. The use
of logical fallacies and/or emotional appeals are the hallmarks of
propagandist messaging.
There doesn’t appear to be very much literature dealing with
propaganda detection using semantic web technologies specifically.
Some closely related challenges are addressed in the following
works:Mitzias et al [16] present a unified semantic infrastructure for
information fusion of terrorism-related content, where propaganda
techniques are often utilized; Castillo-Zúñiga et al [5] present a
framework for generating an ontology in the related domain of
cyber-terrorism using Natural Language Processing and Machine
Learning.
2.2 False Information Identification
Although propaganda doesn’t have to involve falsehoods, false or
misleading information is often an instrument of the propagandist.
Automatic false information identification has been tackled in a va-
riety of ways which can be broken down into four major categories.
This section briefly describes each one.
2.2.1 Style Based. These techniques take into consideration the
linguistic content of the news piece. The premise being, that the
writing style of a fake news item differs from a true one. The theory
is that fake news items tend to appeal to emotions and be generally
more sensationalist. These nuances can be picked up from the text
using Natural Language Processing [2, 32]. Style based techniques
can be used to annotate the nodes in the knowledge graph at the
time of its generation.
2.2.2 Content/Knowledge Based. This is an approach which relies
on fact checking against a large knowledge base, usually one which
is publicly available, for exampleWikipedia. This data is represented
as a Knowledge Graph (KG) in the form of SOP (subject, object,
predicate) triples. At a high level, such triples are extracted from the
news item in question, and checked against the KG. This is typically
posed as a link prediction problem. The challenge with content
based approaches is that KGs are often incomplete, especially when
it comes to recent events.[3, 6, 18]
2.2.3 Network based. Utilizing social context, how false informa-
tion propagates through the network, who is spreading the false
information, and how the spreaders connect with each other, is used
to understand the patterns of false information through network
theory. For example, one can perform a series of random walks to
generate representations of the relationships between news items,
publishers, and users, which can then be fed to a downstream su-
pervised learning model. Here the challenge lies in the dependency
on the social context which is only available after the news item
has propagated through the network, thus early detection, a crucial
component of the solution, is difficult [21, 26, 31].
2.2.4 Human-in-the-loop. To leverage both human insight and
computational efficiency, hybrid approaches have been developed.
In the “wisdom-of-the-crowd” approach [8, 12, 19, 22, 28, 29], no
one individual has to score a news item correctly. Theoretically, the
same number of people will underestimate a news item’s veracity,
as will overestimate it. If enough independent scores are averaged,
this results in an unbiased estimator of the correct score of the item.
Another hybrid technique involves the identification of “checkwor-
thy content” automatically [10], and sending these items for human
review. Again, these techniques can be helpful for annotation at
the time of the KG generation.
2.3 Argument Mining
In 2018, the BBC launched The Evidence Toolkit1 in response to grow-
ing concerns about people’s ability to discern mis/disinformation.
The tool is “designed to encourage users to dissect and critically
appraise the internal reasoning structure of news reports.” It draws
from Argumentation Theory [9] in order to reach this objective.
In Five Years of Argument Mining: a Data-driven Analysis[4],
Cabrio and Villata discuss current approaches to Argument Mining,
ranging from SVM (Support Vector Machine) to RNN (Recurrent
Neural Networks), and NB (Naive Bayes) among others. They list
disinformation detection among the applications of Argument Min-
ing, but they point out that more work is required to improve the
performance of these systems. None of the techniques surveyed
used semantic web techniques. Moreover, the majority of the work
on propaganda detection is done at the document level, or even
more coarsely, at the source level. There are drawbacks to such
coarse classifications. For example, a news source can be generally
propagandist, but that doesn’t mean that all documents produced
or published by that source are necessarily so. In fact, a technique
of propaganda is to disseminate legitimate information in order to
build trust, thus making it easier to manipulate the reader at a later
1https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2020/11/248201-reason-checking-fake-
news/fulltext
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stage. Another downside is the lack of explain-ability as to exactly
which fragments of a document are deemed propagandist and why.
Hence it’s important to aim to detect propagandist devices at a
more granular level.
In 2019, De San Martino et al [7] created and released a data set
for the detection of 18 propaganda devices in News articles, and
invited the AI community to compete in the challenge of detecting
said devices at a granular level. The competition [14] consists of
two tasks: the first task is to identify spans of text containing pro-
pagandist devices, and the second task is a multilabel classification
task to identify the specific device used, such as name calling, or
loaded language. Looking at the leader-board 2 results, this is a
difficult task rarely exceeding F1 scores above 0.5, leaving ample
opportunity for further research. The authors have also provided
code, an API, and a web app 3 for this purpose.
A natural fit for detecting propaganda devices such as faulty
logic is to borrow from the field of argumentation. If logical ar-
guments can be modelled using graphical representations [30] it
may be worth exploring whether graphical representations (ontolo-
gies) can be used to model logical validity, for example by using
description logic such as OWL, and Semantic Web Rule Language
(SWRL). Indeed, in their survey of ontological modeling of rhetori-
cal concepts for argument mining, Mitrovic et al [15], list “political
discourse analysis” as a potential application.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND
CONTRIBUTIONS
Propaganda and disinformation in the media is a serious problem
and has been the subject of research in multiple disciplines. Most of
the work in automating the detection of propaganda and disinfor-
mation has focused on natural language processing and network
analysis. While some efforts have beenmade to utilize semantic web
techniques, especially as it pertains to fact-checking, a challenge
unique to semantic web is the paucity of data suitable to analysis.
One of the objectives of this research is to develop an ontology
for the media ecosystem to aid in the scholarship of the changing
media landscape, and in particular, the evolution of propaganda
in social discourse. For example, one might use PROV to analyse
the origins of problematic ideologies. Another example might be to
use an ontological rule set to evaluate sub-graphs of propaganda in
order to predict if a particular media outlet will promote conspiracy
theories.
Borrowing from network theory and epidemiology, a linked data
knowledge graph can be used to measure the spread of propaganda
and disinformation. One can model the spread in terms of the re-
production number R 4, for the purposes of making simulations and
ultimately for the prevention of spread. In Rules of Contagion[13]
Kucharsky decomposes the R number into four components:




4In the theory of epidemics, R represents the number of new infections we’d expect a
typical infected person to generate on average.
Applying this formula to semantic web, each of the components
can be mapped as per figure 3:
A challenge especially pertinent in the media domain, is the
speed with which new events arrive, and thus the need for the
knowledge base to be frequently updated. Another objective of
the research is to develop a software framework for automatically
extracting triples from unstructured text. Based on the literature
search to date, this is an area which would benefit from improve-
ment.
Having a robust and up to date knowledge base, which also
contains historical information, will help to answer the following
research question:
• RQ - To what extent can semantic web technology be used
to model the spread of propaganda in a rapidly evolving
media ecosystem?
• Hypothesis - If factors such as R-number, provenance, cog-
nitive biases, and economic incentives are included in a
linked data model based on a domain specific ontologywhich
includes PROV, and a description logic for argument mining,
then the spread of propaganda in the media ecosystem can
be predicted exceeding state-of-the-art accuracy.
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND
APPROACH
As this research is only in very early stages, the first step is to
continue the investigation into the state-of-the-art, and to perform
a comprehensive literature review. Other high-level tasks include:
• Continue to flesh out figure 5 by adding nodes and con-
nections, which will help inform the schema/ontology of
the news knowledge graph. Of particular importance are
the relations between drivers and effects, and the paths to
extremist ideology and adverse events.
• Generate News domain Knowledge Graph from unstructured
text (news articles) using the above ontology
• Collect data on a regular basis to build a historical view of
the ecosystem which will be used to measure the evolution
of propagandist messaging as well as to evaluate the models
over time.
Based on the literature search to date, while there are many
mentions of the similarities between information spread and other
disciplines, such as epidemiology and the social sciences, this is
the first attempt to explicitly utilize a multi-disciplinary theoretical
approach into the design of the ontology. A high-level sketch of
the framework is illustrated in figure 4. Two data sets have been
identified as particularly suitable to disinformation and propaganda
detection. The FakeNewsNet [23–25] data set was chosen for its
popularity, so results can be compared to prior work. The PTC
Corpus [14] was chosen for its recency, and because it is annotated
with propaganda devices for fine-grained propaganda detection.
In addition, external knowledge graphs such as DBpedia will be
leveraged to enrich the knowledge graphs generated from text.
5 EVALUATION PLAN
The framework (see figure 4) will have two models which will need
to be evaluated:
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Figure 4: Evaluation stages of the proposed framework
(1) How accurately does the classification model predict propa-
ganda? The ontology will be evaluated using OWL2. The
classification model will be evaluated using an F1 score and
analysed with a confusion matrix. If the probability of pro-
paganda is greater than a predetermined threshold (0.5 by
default), then the contagion model will be executed to deter-
mine spread.
(2) How well does the contagion model predict spread? The
contagion model evaluation requires more work, but suffice
it to say that there is a test set against which the goodness of
the model will be measured. An R number below 1 indicates
that a piece of propaganda will not spread, while larger R
values indicate that it will.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
If this work is successful, there are obvious benefits to society.
The ability to model the spread of propaganda and disinformation
would help businesses and policy makers implement better long
term business models and practices.
There are also some obvious limitations, both exogenous and
self imposed. The research is limited to publicly available data. Pri-
vate social media accounts are not accessible but could potentially
hold very valuable information especially in the planning phase
of adverse events. Similarly, news articles behind paywalls will
not be considered. Furthermore, not all social networks make it
possible to obtain their data. While Twitter has at least a limited
public API, Facebook does not, as is also the case with other plat-
forms. Currently, this work is focused only on (English) text, while
propaganda and disinformation can be spread using images (i.e.
Instagram), and audio/visual media (i.e. Youtube).
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Figure 5: Propaganda and disinformation ecosystem
